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Abstract
Are there Byzantine Animals?
A Fooling Behavior is exhibited by the Cuckoo bird. It sneakily replaces some of the eggs of other species
with its own. Lest the Cuckoo extinct itself by destroying its host, it self-limits its power: It does not replace
too large a fraction of the eggs. Here, we show that any Byzantine Behavior that does not destroy the
system it attacks, i.e. allows the system to solve an easy task like -agreement, then its maliciousness can be
confined to be the exact replica of the Cuckoo bird behavior: Undetectably replace an input of a processor
and let the processor behave correctly thereafter with respect to the new input. In doing so we reduce the
study of Byzantine behavior to fail-stop (benign) behavior with the Cuckoo caveat of a fraction of the inputs
replaced. This goes beyond the reductions shown in the past that apply to colorless tasks. We establish a
complete correspondence between the Byzantine and the Benign, modulo different thresholds, and replaced
inputs.
This work is yet another step in a line of work unifying seemingly distinct distributed system models,
dispelling the Myth that Distributed Computing is a plethora of distinct isolated models, each requiring
its specialized tools and ideas in order to determine solvability of tasks (that is, Computability rather than
Complexity). Thus, hereafter, Byzantine Computability questions can be reduced to questions in the benign
failure setting. But vice versa too. In the more structured settings of asynchronous benign failures and
synchronous Byzantine failures, researchers investigated correlated faults. We show that the known results
about correlated faults in the asynchronous benign setting can be imported verbatim to the asynchronous
Byzantine setting. Finally, as in the benign case in which we have the property that a processor can output
once its faulty behavior stops for long enough, we show this can be done in a similar manner in the Byzantine
case. This necessitated the generalization of Reliable Broadcast to what we term Recoverable Reliable
Broadcast.
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1 Introduction
“Deep Learning” systems are built. They work, and will probably be the underpinning of a new Industrial
Revolution. It happens now and it proceeds lacking serious Theoretical Foundation. Theory, if developed,
will have to play catch-up, explaining why the systems work the way they do. Distributed Computing
history is not unlike the current state of Deep Learning. Distributed Systems have been built and changed
the world. Theory played and still plays catch-up. But does it play successfully? The hallmark of Theory
is Unification. Reducing a seemingly chaos into few principles. This paper, motivated and helped by other
recent successful unification steps, shows that Byzantine Models are, to paraphrase Ecclesiastes (Koheleth)
[1], “Nothing New Under the Sun.”
And, it shows the value of Theory. This paper shows that the solvability of tasks in the Byzantine model
can be reduced to a question about the solvability of tasks in the benign failure model. For a designer of a
distributed system dealing with Byzantine processors, knowing whether the assumptions made theoretically
allow for a solution, is as important as for a designer of a centralized system to know whether the system
actually solves an NP -complete problem, or worse, and Undecidable one. The reduction we introduce
simplifies answering this solvability question.
A limited reduction that applies mainly to the so called colorless tasks has been derived recently in [27]
and then rediscovered in [14]. The authors of [27] claim their reduction is applicable conceptually to more
than colorless tasks. In their later paper [26] there is no mention of [27], that with respect to the non-colorless
task of Multi-Dimensional Epsilon-Agreement [25, 32], a task that we know now can be reduced to benign
failures according to our Cuckoo model, they could have treated it in the benign model instead of resorting
to analysis in the Byzantine model, with all the clutter it carries. The Cuckoo model, by doing away with
the notion of “byzantine processors” removes barriers that are creating blind spots in our understanding. We
give an explicit mapping of the Byzantine in terms of the Benign. The era of Byzantine Computability is
over!
This investigation was motivated by recent unification steps that gave rise to our inquest as to their
ramifications to the Byzantine model.
In [5], it was shown that as far as solving tasks, asynchronous models can be reduced to synchronous
models with mobile-faults. If this is the case in the benign setting, what about the Byzantine? Also, there
[5] processors are always “correct,” they do not “crash.” Their seemingly faulty behavior is due to the
communication subsystem that is faulty. If we view Byzantine behavior not as a pitch-fork equipped Lucifer
which takes over the soul of a processor, but just takes over a processor’s outgoing communication links,
then there is meaning to what Byzantine processor outputs, it is a victim rather than the perpetrator.
Of course the Byzantine Model [29, 24] came to capture a processor malfunction. The point is that a
theoretical model should be faithful in producing results commensurate with observable behavior. It should
not necessarily try to capture the precise mechanism by which this behavior occurs in reality. In the benign
faults model we try to capture “crash,” yet the right way to look at it is just as a worry about crash that
therefore can be captured by communication delay, and thus allows a processor to rejoin after suffering the
delay. Similarly, a Byzantine processor suffers malicious communication tampering, but once the tampering
ceases the processor should be able to join in. Thus, we actually generalize the Byzantine Model of almost
four decades, streamlining it with the benign fault mechanism modeling, while maintaining all legacy results.
The other motivating recent result [20, 15] raised the idea, in the benign case, that the connection be-
tween a processor and the thread it is supposed to execute, is more tenuous than was thought. The connection
can be confined to the processor providing an input to the thread, and then fetching the output, obtained by
the thread termination, to be be delivered to the user. Between providing input and delivering an output to
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the user, advancing the program-counters of active-threads - those whose input has been provided and whose
execution has not been terminated, is a communal effort. It is a negotiation between all processors what a
specific thread has “read” as the system state.
What about the Byzantine model then? If advancing program-counters is a communal effort, what
meaning there is to a “misbehaving-thread?” All processors are responsible for it. Not surprisingly, the
Cuckoo model we derive confines Lucifer only to the point of telling the system what input some of the
threads should be run with. Although motivated by [20, 15] we end up associating a processor with executing
its thread and the communal effort is about accepting or rejecting a proposed step of a processor. It turned
out to be less involved than our initial “pure” communal effort.
In an initial effort ([18]) we got to provide reduction that applies for the “correct” processors, i.e. those
whose communication links were never taken over by a Byzantine adversary. But how do we proceed once
those correct processors output, if we now assume that the Byzantine Adversary gradually relinquishes its
hold of some of the processors it interfered with before. How can a processor made whole (albeit with
respect to its possible fake input) after other processors might have recognized it is faulty and stopped
listening to it?
Current classical technique of “Reliable Broadcast” ([11]) does not allow recovery from such an implicit
shut-off. Yet, in the benign failure “recovery” is trivial, as a seemingly “crashed” processor comes alive.
Can it be that this fiat is doomed in the Byzantine case? This will contradict our sense of elegance that
there should be complete analogy between the Byzantine and the Benign systems. Indeed, the most time-
consuming part of the technical research involved in this paper was to eventually abandon the belief and the
trials at a proof that this incomplete analogy is inherent and actually come with a modification to Reliable
Broadcast (Recoverable Reliable Broadcast) that makes the analogy complete.
It also necessitated our generalization of the notion of what a model is while leaving it compatible with
the past definitions. Traditionally, a model prescribes progress conditions independent of the execution of an
algorithm. Here we allow progress conditions to change as a function of the outputs delivered. We assume
a model in which once n − t outputs are delivered then at least from there on one additional processor that
has not outputted will not experience further attacks on its communication anymore.
Finally, if our reduction is complete it should go the other way around too. We should be able to import
models and results from the Benign to the Byzantine. In the synchronous and then the asynchronous benign
models a body of work analyzed Correlated Faults (Also called Adversary Model) [23, 6, 16, 22, 21], and
characterized the computability of such models. Our reduction allows to do same for the Asynchronous
Byzantine once we have derived Reliable Broadcast [11] for Correlated Faults. We do just that. That said,
we nevertheless keep the paper cast in the t-resilience and faulty/correct processors nomenclature, as after
almost four decades most of us are more comfortable with it, even though it is exactly what this paper
advocates to forget.
In the next section we elaborate on the models we deal with in this paper. Then embark on a sequence
of reductions, introduce the Recoverable Reliable Broadcast, present Reliable Broadcast for the correlated
faults model, review related work, and close with concluding remarks. But first, we summarize our contri-
butions.
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1.1 Contributions
1.1.1 Results
1. The t-resilient Asynchronous Byzantine model is equivalent to the t-resilient Asynchronous Benign
model, where at most t of the user’s inputs have been changed (i.e. the asynchronous Cuckoo model).
2. The t-resilient Asynchronous Byzantine model is equivalent to the a synchronous t-mobile model,
where at most t of the user’s inputs have been changed (i.e. the synchronous Cuckoo model).
3. Extend Correlated Faults to the Asynchronous Byzantine model.
4. Design a Recoverable Reliable Broadcast algorithm where a processor under attack can recover once
some attacks stop (signaled by the number of outputs).
1.1.2 Concepts
1. Byzantine models as an attack on the communication subsystem rather than at attack on the proces-
sor’s program.
2. A model notion as conditions for progress where the condition might change as a function of the
outputs already delivered.
3. Ascribe meaning of output to a “byzantine processor,” and require its progress once the attack stops.
2 Tasks, Models and Problem Statement
In this section we first repeat the notion of task, define the models we deal with, and state the problem this
paper solves.
2.1 Tasks
A task is the elementary problem a distributed system implements. In distributed computing a task play the
role a function plays in centralized computing. The task is a mathematical triple (I,O,Γ), where I consists
of set of tuples of sets of processors with their inputs, O consists of set tuples of sets of processors with
outputs, and Γ is a set of binary relations assigning a set of output tuples from O, to any given input tuple
from I . This relation is subject to the constraint the the set of processors in the input tuple, and the set of
processors in the output tuples match. Hence, notions like “correct” and “faulty” that might come from a
model, should not be referred to in a definition of a task.
The task prescribes to each participating set of processors with their inputs, what are the output combi-
nations that they are allowed.
The notion of which processors participate in a protocol and which are not is model dependent. In
general, if a set is participating it should be a set of processors that is closed under the relation “affected by.”
A participating processor should be oblivious to a non-participating one.
For instance, in the task of leader election on two processors p0 and p1, the input sets are
{{(p0, p0)}, {(p1, p1)}, {(p0, p0), (p1, p1)}},
the output sets are
{{(p0, p0)}, {(p1, p1)}, {(p0, p0), (p1, p0)}, {(p0, p1), (p1, p1)}},
and Γ is
{((p0, p0), (p0, p0)), (p1, p1), (p1, p1)), (((p0, p0), (p1, p1)), ((p0, p0), (p1, p0))), (((p0, p0), (p1, p1)), ((p0, p1), (p1, p1)))}.
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2.2 Models
A model is a setting in which processors learn about each other’s input, to produce each an output. The
problem processors face is that they are required to output, under a limited knowledge of other processors
input, and correspondingly, limited knowledge what other inputs other processors know. Hence to learn
enough information to output, they are involved in negotiations of telling each other what input they know
and updating their knowledge about others. Of course, they cannot negotiate forever and need to output at
some point, hence the problem.
Depending on the assumptions about the means of the negotiations, some models are more “tightly
coupled” than others allowing to solve a larger set of tasks. In this paper we do not consider systems
that cannot solve -agreement [17]. In this task we are given a finite interval of R of size at least 1/.
Processors’ inputs are arbitrary integers in the interval and all have to output integers within the convex hull
of the inputs such that pairwise they output either the same integer or distinct integers which are adjacent.
We do not consider models which cannot solve -agreement, as we expect any reasonable system to have
enough coordination power to solve this task.
Processors negotiate and output. After outputting they linger around to help other processors communi-
cate (essentially by serving in effect as repeaters).
We take the view of a model following [2] as a contract between a specifier and a programmer (cf.
Rely-Guarantee in [2]). Progress, in the form of additional processors outputting, is required in runs of
the model where the specifier guarantees hold. We insert a new element to the contract not used in the
past. The specification may be parametrized by processors’ outputs. E.g. in the t-resilient case the specifier
promises that all processors but t will participate and will infinitely often take steps in the negotiations (be
alive). Under these conditions, the programmer is to deliver at least all but t outputs. Thereafter the specifier
requires an output if at least all but t processors are alive, and at least among the live processors, there is a
processor that hasn’t outputted yet.
2.2.1 The Models in this Paper
We assume a set of n processors Π = {p1, p2, ..., pn}. The asynchronous settings is the classical asyn-
chronous processors communicating over a point to point complete network. But, our definition of Asyn-
chrony and Byzantine is not Classical. While traditionally faulty behavior has been ascribed to processors,
we ascribe it to the communication subsystem. We assume an adversary that can manipulate outgoing
messages. What the Byzantine and the Benign here have in common is that each has a set of bad-set of
processors B, where for all B ∈ B, B ⊂ Π and if B′ ⊂ B then B′ ∈ B, i.e the set of bad-sets is subset
closed. A good-set is any set Π \ B. We denote the set of good-sets G. In the Benign Fault model the
Adversary can remove messages sent by a set of processors from B. In the Byzantine case it can not only
remove messages from B but also alter their content before delivery (but, it cannot generate messages on
it own). Traditionally, t-resilience stands for a bad-set collection B that contains any set of cardinality less
than t+ 1.
1. Benign Asynchronous System: The adversary can choose a set of processors of cardinality of at most
t and remove some or all of their messages. Otherwise it can delay any message sent by anybody for
any finite time. This allows the programmer to use the construct “wait until received messages from a
(good-)set of cardinality n− t,” when all processor are programmed to send messages to all.
Under this conditions, the programmer is obliged to deliver at least n − t outputs. From there on
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the delivery of outputs hinges on the additional condition that the messages sent by some processor
which hasn’t outputted will not be delayed infinitely long. (Traditionally, some researchers allowed
processors which have output to halt. This is a mistake and cannot be sustained in the Byzantine
Asynchronous Model. Therefore, in general, we take the view that processors never halt.)
2. Byzantine Asynchronous system: In this system in addition to the above, the adversary has the
power to change the content of messages sent from a fixed set processors of cardinality at most t.
Notice that we do not allow the adversary to inject messages into the system by itself. (This last
condition is restrictive with respect to the view that Byzantine means that a processor was taken over,
yet we claim that nevertheless all legacy results hold.)
Remark The traditional threshold Byzantine Asynchronous model motivated a variation of the -
agreement task in which the at most two integers output have to be in the convex-hull of every n − t
inputs [17]. It is easy to see that the new variation we may pose in which we require the output integers
to be in the convex-hull of every good set, is also solvable using the same techniques as in [17]. And,
in the multi-dimensional version of the problem we can replace the t “bad” processors by an adversary
that captures t (i.e. t, n/4 replace by good sets each 4 of which have nonempty intersection). This
allow to calculate the resulting set consensus power via reduction to the benign adversary.
The Cuckoo Asynchronous system: This system is a Benign Asynchronous system in which the adver-
sary not only remove messages from a set of cardinality at most t but it also might, unbeknowethed to
the affected processors, change their inputs.
The problem statement of this paper is to show the equivalence between the Byzantine Asynchronous
system and the Cuckoo Asynchronous system.
Our notion of equivalence between two models is that they both solve the same set of tasks. In the
Byzantine/Cuckoo model, it is up to the user to define this notion of solvability since the adversary
might produce an input combination not expected by the user. We claim equivalence whichever way
the user will resolve such a notion, as our mechanism of showing the equivalence is by showing that
any protocol in one model can be emulated by a protocol in the other.
Remark: Once we are in the Byzantine case past n − t outputs we tread in an unchartered territory.
Never before the concept of an output from a “byzantine processor” was considered. What we try
to capture is a correct processor, that snoops at others communication while what it sends may be
under attack. And then, whether it can make itself whole once the attack ceases (albeit with possibly
changed input). When does an attack cease? What the specifier promises the programmer, in this
case, is that once n− t outputs are delivered, one of the processors that have not output yet will cease
to be under attack. From there on its messages would not be altered any more and all its messages
sent thereafter will eventually be delivered. We use the term “become correct” for such a processor,
and “correct” for a processor whose messages are never attacked by the adversary. Observe that after
a processor becomes correct, the adversary can still choose to deliver old and manipulated messages
the processor had sent prior to recovering (becoming correct).
3. Synchronous Mobile Adversary: We show that the two asynchronous systems above are equiv-
alent to synchronous systems. The Benign Asynchronous is equivalent to a synchronous system in
which the choice of at most t processors from which the adversary may remove messages is a choice
per round, hence the name “mobile” adversary. We also show that the Byzantine Asynchronous sys-
tem is equivalent to synchronous system as above, only that now the adversary can also tamper with
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messages rather than just remove them. The point of the paper is that this additional power of tamper-
ing can be confined to appear just as changing some t inputs at most, and from there on the adversary
can just remove messages, i.e resulting in the Synchronous Mobile Cuckoo Model. We denote these
systems as BI-MO(Binitial) where in the benign asynchronous case the input set to the synchronous
equivalent system is the empty set.
Remark: The gap between the Asynchronous system we presented and the Synchronous Mobile is
large. In the latter, in a round, the missed messages are all confined to messages from a single set of
at the most cardinality t. In the former, the asynchronous case, each processor might miss at most
t messages too, but the missed messages are not confined to come from the same set of cardinality
at most t. The direct synchronous analog to the asynchronous system is to allow the adversary to
attack the reception process rather than the transmission process: For every process pi in a round, the
adversary can choose at most t incoming messages to be removed. This leads us to the synchronous
system denoted by BI-Synch. The BI-Synch will be mediating between the Asynchronous and the
Synchronous breaking the final reduction into two intermediate reductions.
2.3 The Correlated-Faults Adversary Model
In [23, 6] it was suggested to replace the condition for synchronous Byzantine agreement from n ≥ 3t+1 to a
list of faulty set B under the condition that no union of three sets from B is Π. By showing that this condition
is enough to implement Reliable Broadcast all our results cast in the resilience model carry verbatim to the
correlated case with all the implications and results of correlated case in the Benign model (see Section 6).
Obviously if the condition is violated and the union of some three sets is Π, then the Adversary can cause
network partition with no possibility of a meaningful computation.
3 Simulating a protocol running in BI-Synch system
In this part we emulate any protocol running in a BI-Synch system by a protocol running in a t-Byzantine
resilient asynchronous system. Thus, we prove that the adversary in an asynchronous system with the t
processors it controls and with the ability of delaying messages to all processors does not have any more
power than the adversary in the synchronously running BI-Synch system.
The idea behind the simulation is to completely simulate the original protocol running in a BI-Synch
system by a protocol running at each processor in a t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system, such that
every processor that becomes correct in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system would get the same
output as it would have gotten in the BI-Synch system. We assume that initially there are n − t correct
processors, and new processors are relieved from the adversary’s control and become correct during the run
of the protocol.
In the emulation appearing in this section we make use of two elements. The first element employed
is to make sure that every processor commits to the message it sends in each round in a way that if any
processor accepts a message m, everyone will eventually accept the same message m, and before accepting
m it accepts all m’s causally ordered prior messages. Thus, the first element, CO SEND (Algorithm 2), is
a Causally Ordered Recoverable Reliable Broadcast primitive, which uses a generalization of the classical
reliable broadcast as a building block, combined with the causality of message delivery (generalizing a
combination of [11, 7]). As we detail below, to further limit the ability of the adversary to confuse processors
we instruct each processor, after sending its initial input, to send only the list of IDs of the processors
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Algorithm 1: Simulating a BI-Synch system deterministic protocol
in an asynchronous system with n > 3t.
/* executed at processor p */
1. set ∀k accept[k] := ∅; /* the sets of senders whose messages were processes at the given rounds */
2. setM := ∅; M¯ := ∅; /* the set of accepted messages that were not processed yet , and the set of processed messages */
3. set O := ∅; ; /* the set of processors that their SM reached an output at the processor */
4. r := 1; /* the round number */
5. invoke CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast I; /* broadcast the input value, a processor sends also to itself */
6. do until SMp halts: /* participate in all CO SEND(`, ∗), ` ≤ r, protocols */
7. wait until |accept[r]| ≥ n− t and p ∈ accept[r];
8. /* “empty line” - for later use */
9. r := r + 1;
10. invoke CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast accept[r − 1]; /* broadcast the accepted and processed set in round r − 1 */
11. end.
In the Background:
12. Execute for each 〈r′, pi, pi〉 ∈ M: /* accepted message from pi for round r′ */
13. if r′ = 1 then start SMi with input pi; /* start a SM with the initial input */
14. if r′ > 1 then
15. let M := {mj | pj ∈ pi and SMj [r′ − 1] sends mj to pi}; /* the values pi should have received */
16. SMi[r
′] := F(M,SMi[r′ − 1], r′); /* apply protocol F to determine the next state of SMi */
17. if SMi outputs then O := O ∪ {pi}; /* Denote the outputting processor */
18. M :=M\ 〈r′, pi, pi〉;
19. M¯ := M¯ ∪ 〈r′, pi〉;
20. accept[r′] := accept[r′] ∪ {pi}.
it claims to accept and process messages from in the previous round, without any additional content (we
differentiate between receiving a message, agreeing to accept it as a legitimate message to be processed,
and processing it). The second element is to locally simulate the state of the original protocol at every other
processor, according to the list of processors’ IDs being accepted, to determine what the original (simulated)
protocol instructs each processor to do, what values should be sent and which should be received.
Let P be a deterministic message passing protocol that is executed in a BI-Synch system. We will show
a simulation of P in a t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system. In the simulation, in the first round each
processor, p, uses CO SEND(1, p) to broadcast its own input value, I. In each subsequent round, r, each
processor, p, uses CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast to everyone a set, pir−1, of the IDs of the processors from
which it accepted and processed messages in the previous round, round r − 1.
We start with an overview of the simulation protocol (Algorithm 1). Each processor, p, maintains locally
n = |Π| state machines, SMi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to reflect the state machines of the original (simulated) protocol
at each other processor. When p accepts via CO SEND a message 〈1, I〉 from a processor pi, it initiates state
machine SMi with the input value I. If p does not accept such a message from a processor, say q, it does
not start the state machine SMq. The properties of CO SEND ensure that if any processor will ever accept a
message 〈1, I〉 from a processor q, then eventually processor p will also accept it too.
When processor p accepts via CO SEND a message 〈2, pi1〉 from a processor pi, it uses the initial input
values of all qj ∈ pi1 as the set of input values to SMi to determine what values the simulated protocol P
instructs processor pi to send to every other processor in round 2 of protocol P . Since CO SEND implements
Causally Ordered Reliable Broadcast, before processor p processes 〈2, pi1〉 from a processor pi, it already
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accepted and processed all 〈1, I〉 messages from all processors in pi1, and therefore knows the values pi
should have received from the members of pii. Observe that if the adversary causes the message from
processor pi to claim to accept an input from a processor, say q, that did not send it an input, then the 〈2, pi1〉
message received from pi will be put aside and the CO SEND invoked by pi will not be completed at any
other processor until (and if) the input from q will be processed.
Now recursively, when processor p accepts via CO SEND a message 〈r, pir−1〉 from a processor pi, it
uses the values every qj ∈ pir−1 should have sent in round r − 1 of protocol P to pi according to qj’s state
machine SMj at round r − 1, as values received by SMi in the previous round (round r − 1) to determine
what values the simulated protocol P instructs processor pi to send to every other processor in round r.
The simulation protocol, presented in Algorithm 1, maintains four data structures,M,M¯, accept and
O. The setM contains the messages that were accepted via CO SEND and were not processed yet. There is
at most one such message per sender (because all messages of the same sender are casually related). Each
entry in M contains a round number, say r, a processor ID, say pi, and the set of processors’ IDs, from
which processor pi claims to have accepted and processed messages in round r − 1.
The set M¯ contains the list of processors whose messages were already processed by processor p, and
their SMs are updated accordingly. Each entry in M¯ contains a round number, say r, a processor ID, say
pi, indicating that round r message from pi was accepted and processed. By the CO SEND properties, every
processor that processes a round r message from pi processes the identical message.
The CO SEND protocol, Algorithm 2, is a communication procedure that exchanges messages and holds
received messages until they are ready to be accepted and processed. The CO SEND properties (as we later
explain) imply that when an entry is added toM, all casually prior entries were already accepted and pro-
cessed (thus, are already in M¯ ), and as such are reflected in the respective state machines (as we explain
later). Therefore, each message inM can be processed independently, since there are no causal dependen-
cies among them. Processing a message is just applying it to the state machine of the sending processor,
using the current state of the state machines of all the processors it claimed to accept their messages in the
previous round. Once a message is processed it is removed fromM and added to M¯. Observe that the sim-
ulation may indicate that at a certain round some processor is not sending a value to some other processor,
then in such a case no such value is produced as an input to the relevant state machine.
The third data structure (accept) is the set of processors whose messages were accepted and processed in
the given round. accept[r] is the current set of all the processors whose round r messages were accepted and
processed by p via CO SEND. Once |accept[r]| ≥ n− t, and p ∈ accept[r], processor p uses CO SEND(r +
1, p) to broadcast the set accept[r]. After broadcasting this message processor p continues to accept all
rounds’ messages via CO SEND and continues to apply them to the various state machines. Each processor
continues this process, outputs its output, and sends messages until its state machine halts.1
The fourth data structure is the list of processors whose state machines produced outputs at the processor.
Whenever the processor learns that some state machine produced an output it adds it to the set O.
Observe that the emulation, presented in Algorithm 1, produces per each processor an agreed upon
sequence of sets of values M0, ...Mr−1 processed by its SM in the related rounds, thus, simulating the exact
behavior of protocol P . This implies that the above emulation is a protocol to simulate in a t-Byzantine
resilient asynchronous system a deterministic message passing protocol, P , in a BI-Synch system.
The enabling properties of the simulation reside in the details of CO SEND, which we now describe. The
CO SEND protocol, Algorithm 2, is invoked per processor per sending round and consists of 3 conceptual
1The processor continues to participate in the CO SEND protocols of other processors even after it halts. One can add a halting
task that enables a processor to halt once enough other processors reach the right stage.
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Algorithm 2: CO SEND(r, s): A casually ordered reliable broadcast
with asynchronous system with n > 3t.
M, M¯ and O are globally maintained sets /* executed by processor p with sender s in round r, invoked once per round */
Sender’s Protocol: /* s is the sender and vs the value it broadcasts */
1. The sender s invokes RecRB(s) with vs to send to all. /* RecRB is a recoverable Reliable Broadcast (see Section 4)
*/
Any Processor’s Protocol:
2. Upon receiving an RecRB(s) protocol message with value v:
3. if (r > 1 ) wait until s ∈ v and ∀q ∈ v, 〈r − 1, q〉 ∈ M¯; /* wait for the causally prior messages */
4. join RecRB(s) as participant; /* joined at most once per sender per round */
5. case accepted RecRB(s) with value v′:
6. if (r > 1 ) wait until ∀q ∈ v′, 〈r − 1, q〉 ∈ M¯; /* wait for the causally prior messages */
7. Accept:M :=M∪ 〈r, s, v′〉. /* accept message v′ as the message sent by processor s in round r */
Case A new processor is added to O, i.e., outputs: /* Try to recover */
8. if |O| ≥ n− t then sender s repeats the last send of Line 1. /* repeat the last sending */
parts. In the first part the sender of the current instance of the protocol (in Line 1) invokes RecRB, a
recoverable Reliable Broadcast (see Section 4), to send its value to everyone.
RecRB ensures that:
RRB1 If the sender s is correct when it invokes RecRB with value v, then every processor will eventually
accept RecRB(s) with the value v.
RRB2 If any processor accepts RecRB(s) with a value v′, then every processor will accept it with the same
value.
RRB3 If sender s did not invoke RecRB(s) no processor will accept RecRB(s).
RRB4 If the sender s becomes correct after invoking the protocol, then every processor will eventually accept
RecRB(s).
The second part is executed by every processor. In the first round, every processor joins the RecRB
invoked by the sender. In later rounds processors validate the value, since the value is a set of processors
whose messages were accepted in the previous round. We need to ensure that if the RecRB will be accepted,
the resulting value will be consistent with the local views of all processors. To ensure that, if a processor
learns that the RecRB was invoked by s it waits until the value sent is contained in its own view of the
previous round (Line 3). It joins the invoked RecRB only when this holds. It joins a single invocation per
sender per round. The local testing ensures that the accepted value will eventually enable every processor to
apply the accepted value to the local state machine of SMs. Since the accepted value may differ from the
value first seen by the processor, the participating processor waits again (Line 7) until its local view becomes
consistent with the accepted value. This is guaranteed to happen eventually, since the accepted value tested
by any processor will eventually hold at any other processor.
If s is not correct when it invokes the protocol, the protocol may get blocked. For example, if the local
test in (Line 3) fails at all processors. If s is recovered (becomes correct) while running this protocol, when
it resends its value in (Line 1) the protocol recovers. The third part intends to catch exactly that. Every time
a new processor recovers while running CO SEND, its CO SEND will complete successfully. The adversary
may cause each processor it controls to resend values at most 2t times.
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Given the above discussion, it is clear that if the sender is correct, all processors will eventually complete
the protocol and will accept its value. Moreover, if any processor accepts a message, every processor will
end up eventually accepting the same message, after accepting and processing all causally prior messages
to that message. Thus, we outlined the proof of the following claim.
Lemma 1. If n > 3t , then Algorithm 2 implements a Causally Ordered Recoverable Reliable Broadcast
transport layer in which if a sender s uses CO SEND to send its messages, each processor accepts messages
that satisfy:
CO1: If a correct sender, s, sends a consecutive sequence of messages, then every processor accepts the
sequence in the same order that it was sent.
CO2: For r > 1, if a processor, p, accepts a v via CO SEND(r, s), then s ∈ v and p already accepted vj via
CO SEND(r − 1, pj), for every pj ∈ v.
CO3: If a processor, p, accepts a v via CO SEND(r, s), then every processor will accept v via CO SEND(r, s).
The above discussions, Lemma 1, and given that a processor moves to the next round, once it accepts
and processes current round messages from a set of n− t processors, imply the following result.
Lemma 2. Given a deterministic protocol P that is viewed as a function F(Mr−1, Sp, r), for r ≥ 1, in
a BI-Synch system, the emulation protocol presented in Algorithm 1 simulates it at every processor in a
t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system, provided that n > 3t .
Proof. To prove the claim what we need to show is a mapping of processors and inputs from a t-Byzantine
resilient asynchronous system to the corresponding processors and inputs in a BI-Synch system; and show
that every run in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system corresponds to a possible run in the BI-Synch
system and that correct processors in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system obtain the same output
the corresponding processors obtain in the BI-Synch system.
Let B be the set of Byzantine processors the adversary initially controls. Let G = Π \ B be the
appropriate set of correct processors. We map the processors’ IDs the same in both systems, and we will
consider those processors controlled by the adversary in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system as
the Cuckoo set, those receiving a bad input in the BI-Synch system.
Assign to a processor in the BI-Synch model the input value a correct processor obtained from the
respective CO SEND in Line 5 of Algorithm 1, when running it in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous
system (processors that never take an action in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system are part of
B and will be considered as processors in the BI-Synch model whose messages never arrive to any other
processor). Thus, at the beginning of the first phase, once the inputs are introduced, the state of the corre-
sponding processors are the same.
The set of IDs each processor receives (and accepts) in the first round is the set it sends when executing
Line 10. The state of each processor p at the end of round 1 is the state it obtains when processing its round
1 message when executing Line 16. Observe that every correct processor eventually complete the first round
and send its initial input. Thus, at the end of round 1, the local state of processor p is the same state its state
in BI-Synch model at the end of round 1. Observe that, by Lemma 1, any other processor that computes
locally the state of processor p, when it processes processor’s p round 1 message when executing Line 16
will obtain the same state at its local state machine of processor p.
Now, by induction, we can show that the set of processors each processor p accepts in round r is what it
sends in Line 10, contains a set of n − t processors. Its state after processing the round r messages (at the
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beginning of round r + 1) is what every processor obtains when processing its broadcasted message when
executing Line 16.
When the protocol in the BI-Synch model instructs a processor p to produce an output the SM at every
processor will produce in the t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system the identical output. Observe that in
our model all processors will run all state machines of all initially correct processors, and thus will produce
the outputs. Once a SM produces an output at any processor, it eventually produces the same output at every
other processor. Once a processor learns about an output (executing Line 17 of Algorithm 1) it updated
its list of outputs. Thus, once all initially correct processors output, every processor learns about that, and
will try to recover. One of them will recover and will reach an output state. The process repeats itself, and
eventually all processors output on all state machines.
4 Recoverable Reliable Broadcast
Traditional Reliable Broadcast ensures properties [RRB1] - [RRB3], below. The adversary may cause a
traditional Reliable Broadcast protocol to block when it is invoked by a processors it controls, by sending
conflicting values to different processors. Our aim is to ensure that once a processor recovers, the protocol
it previously invoked while being controlled by the adversary will recover and complete. To obtain that we
extend the properties of Reliable Broadcast to be:
RRB1 If the sender s is correct when it invokes RecRB with value v, then every processor will eventually
accept RecRB(s) with the value v.
RRB2 If any processor accepts RecRB(s) with a value v′, then every processor will accept it with the same
value.
RRB3 If sender s did not invoke RecRB(s) no processor will accept RecRB(s).
RRB4 If the sender s becomes correct after invoking the protocol, then every processor will eventually accept
RecRB(s).
The Recoverable Reliable Broadcast protocol presented in this section (Algorithm 3) obtains these prop-
erties. The protocol uses as a building block the classical Reliable Broadcast protocol (Algorithm 6, see Sec-
tion 6), that was developed by Bracha [11], and was used by many researchers ever since.
The challenge is in ensuring that despite the degree of freedoms the adversary has in trying to confuse
processors by changing the content of messages it can’t block recovered processors from making progress.
The high level idea of the protocol is that the sender will repeatedly push forward a value via a sequence of
sending attempts, until any of the attempts collects support for the same value from at least n− t processors.
Each attempt brings every processor to invoke a Reliable Broadcast to send the value it received from the
sender for that attempt. Each participant maintains a data structure in which it collects the accepted Reliable
Broadcasts and the values it accepted for each attempt.
The protocol is composed of three parts. In the first part the sender sends in each iteration a value and
the set (H[k−1]) of accepted Reliable broadcasts of the previous iteration (Line 5). In the first iteration this
set is the empty set. The processor waits (Line 6) until it accepts at least n − t Reliable Broadcasts. Once
this happens it determines (Line 7) the value it should send in the next attempt. The value chosen is either a
unique value appearing at least t+ 1 times or the original value the sender started the protocol with. Notice
that if the sender was correct when it invoked the protocol the value is always the value it started with. The
sender repeats this process until for any attempt (Line 8) there are n − t identical values. In such a case it
12
Algorithm 3: RecRB(s): Recoverable Reliable Broadcast
with asynchronous system that satisfies the Byzantine Fault predicate
O is a globally maintained sets /* executed by processor p with sender s, invoked once per round per sender */
1. set H[k] = ∅ for any k ≥ 0 /* H[k] includes all accepted RB of round k */
Sender’s Protocol:
2. k := 0; v := vs;
3. repeat
4. k := k + 1;
5. send 〈v, k,H[k − 1]〉 to all; /* s is the sender and v the value it attempts to broadcast */
6. wait until |H[k]| ≥ n− t /* n− t different RB were accepted */
7. if ∃ unique v¯, s.t. |{q | (q, v¯) ∈ H[k]}| ≥ t+ 1 then v := v¯ else v := vs; /* either v¯ or the input value */
8. until ∃k′, v′, s.t. |{q | (q, v′) ∈ H[k′]}| ≥ n− t /* n− t different RB were accepted with a value v */
Any Processor’s Protocol: /* the sender also run this protocol */
9. case received 〈v, k,H ′[k − 1]〉 from s:
10. wait until H ′[k − 1] ⊂ H[k − 1] /* the sender also run this protocol */
11. if (did not invoked RB for k) and (6 ∃v′ 6= v s.t. |{q | (q, v′) ∈ H ′[k − 1]}| ≥ t+ 1)
12. then invoke RB(k, p) with value v ; /* executed at most once per k */
13. case accepted v¯ via RB(k, q):
14. add (q, v¯) to H[k];
15. case ∃k′, v′, s.t. |{q | (q, v′) ∈ H[k′]}| ≥ n− t: /* n− t different RB were accepted with a value v */
16. accept RecRB(s) with value v′. /* accept message v′ as the message sent by processor s via RecRB */
Case A new processor is added to O, i.e., outputs: /* Try to recover */
17. if |O| ≥ n− t then sender s repeats the last send of Line 5. /* repeat the last sending */
can stop, and it knows that every processor will end up seeing that value in at least one iteration, as we argue
below.
The second part is executed by every participant, including the sender. When a processor receives from
the sender (Line 9) a value and a set of the accepted Reliable Broadcasts at the previous iteration, as claimed
by the sender, it carries various validation tests prior to invoking the next Reliable Broadcast. It first waits
until the set of Reliable Broadcasts if accepts (H[k − 1]) contains the set (H ′[k − 1) of the sender. Next
it checks whether the value received from the sender does not contradict the set H ′[k − 1]. If both hold
and the processor did not already invoke a Reliable Broadcast with index k it invokes one. The processor
collects all accepted Reliable Broadcasts in its data-structure H[k], whenever any is accepted, in the context
of the current RecRB (Line 13), until it identifies that its data structure contains at least n−t identical values
for some iteration (Line 15). Once this happens it accepts that value as the sender’s value of the invoked
RecRB. Because of recovering, a processor may get more than a single message per iteration (at most t such
messages in total). It invokes the corresponding reliable broadcast on at most one of these messages.
Observe that if any processor accepts a value for the current RecRB, that value will be accepted by every
processor. The reason is that the Reliable Broadcast properties imply that what one data structure contains,
every data structure will eventually contain. Moreover, we argue that there will not be two different values
accepted. Let k¯ be the minimal index for which any processor eventually collects at least n − t accepted
Reliable Broadcasts for some value v¯, then the value being sent by the sender in iteration k¯ + 1 can contain
only v¯. If it differs from that value (due to adversarial manipulation), then it will fail the tests of Line 10 and
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Line 11 at any processor, and would never be sent by any processor.
The third part intends to help the sender to complete the protocol in the case it recovers and its previous
message caused the participating processors not to invoke the corresponding Reliable Broadcasts. When it
identifies that the number of processors that gave output is more than n − t, it knows that there is a chance
it will be recovered; and in such a case it repeats the last sending each time it learns about another processor
outputting.
Observe that if the sender was correct before the invocation of RecRB, then eventually every processor
will see n − t identical copies of its value in the first iteration, or in any later iteration. Also notice, that
if any processor accepts the RecRB of the sender, everyone will eventually accept it with the same value.
Thus, proving the 4 properties of RecRB.
5 Simulating a protocol in a BI-MO(Binitial) system
To finalize the main result of the paper we will now expand the simulation from simulating a protocol P that
runs is a BI-Synch system to a protocol in a BI-MO(Binitial) system. The extension is to ensure that before
a processor adapts the accept set it communicates with others to converge to accept sets such that all sets
have at least n− t processors in common. To achieve that we introduce another element, we run a couple of
rounds of the equivalent to a full information message exchange to make sure that everyone shares messages
from a set of at least n− t processors. Once this happens the processor takes its next step.
COMMON CORE, is an adaptation of the Get-Core approach mentioned in [7] (attributed to the second
author) and a variation of it that was later presented in [3] as Binding Gather, and using ideas from [4].
Each processor invokes the COMMON CORE protocol, appearing in Algorithm 4, with a set of at least n−t
different processors IDs. Each processor, p, returns as an output a set of at least n− t different processors’
IDs, such that at least n−t of them are shared by the outputs of all processors. The COMMON CORE properties
are:
• Validity: At each processor, the output set of IDs contains the input set of IDs.
• Commonality: There exists a set of n− t IDs that appears in the output set of every processor.
• Termination: All correct processors eventually output some non-empty set of IDs.
A set that is in every output set is called a common core. The COMMON CORE primitive is described in Al-
gorithm 4. In the first round, everyone sends its accept[r] set. In the background the processor continues to
update its accept[r] set with messages it continues to accept. To complete the first round of COMMON CORE,
it waits to receive at least n− t sets that are contained in its current state of the set accept[r]. This will even-
tually happen due to the CO SEND properties, and the fact that there are at least n − t correct processors.
Once this happens it sends again its current set and waits again to received at least n − t second round sets
that are contained in its current state of the set.
Observe that a recovering processor does not need to repeat the last sending as it did in previous proto-
cols..
The correctness proof is similar to the proof of get-core in [7]. The original proof did not include
Byzantine nodes, therefore we need to change it a bit. Define a table T with n− t raws and n− t columns,
that refer to a set G of n − t correct processors. The accept[r] value of each correct processor contains at
least n − t IDs, therefore it contains at least n − 2t ≥ t + 1 IDs of processors in G represented in T . For
pi, pj ∈ G, entry T [i, j] in the table is 1 if pj is one of the n − t processors that pi waited for in order to
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Algorithm 4: COMMON CORE(accept[r]), the Common Core protocol
/* the input set accept[r] is updated contineously in the background according to the messages accepted via CO SEND and
processed in Algorithm 1 */
1. step 1 send(r, 1, accept[r]) to all; /* send the input set to all, a processor sends also to itself */
2. wait until |{j | received(r, 1, pij) from pj , and pij ⊆ accept[r]}| ≥ n− t;
3. step 2 send(r, 2, accept[r]) to all; /* the set accept[r] is being continuously updated in the background */
4. wait until |{j | received(r, 2, pij) from pj , and pij ⊆ accept[r]}| ≥ n− t;
5. return accept[r].
complete the first round of COMMON CORE, and 0 otherwise. Observe that if 1 appears in entry T [i, j], the
accepti[r] sent by pi in the second round contains all the n − t IDs appearing in the initial acceptj [r] sent
by pj in the first round of the COMMON CORE protocol.
Since all correct processors will eventually invoke COMMON CORE, T will contain at least (n− t)(t+ 1)
entries with 1. This implies that there is an ID of a correct processor, say p¯, that appears in at least t + 1
raws. Thus, there are at least t + 1 correct processors whose second round set includes the n − t IDs that
appear in the initial set of p¯. Before completing the protocol, each processor waits to get the sets of n − t
processors, so it includes the set of at least one of these t+ 1 processors, thus includes the set of n− t IDs
appearing in the initial list of p¯.
Lemma 3. For n > 3t, the protocol presented in Algorithm 4 implements the COMMON CORE properties.
To obtain the final protocol we add the COMMON CORE invocation to the simulation protocol presented in
Algorithm 1. We invoke the COMMON CORE protocol on all the accept sets of a given round after completing
Line 7 and before executing Line 10 of Algorithm 1. The output of the COMMON CORE is used in Line 10
as the set of processors from which we received messages from in that round. Algorithm 5 presents the
complete protocol.
Theorem 1. Given a deterministic protocol P that is viewed as a function F(Mr−1, Sp, r), for r ≥ 1,
in a BI-MO(Binitial) system, the protocol presented in Algorithm 5 simulates it in a t-Byzantine resilient
asynchronous system, provided that n > 3t.
Corollary 1. For n > 3t and deterministic protocols, t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system and
BI-MO(Binitial) system are equivalent.
Theorem 2. For n > 3t and deterministic protocols, t-Byzantine resilient asynchronous system is equivalent
to t-resilient asynchronous system in a Cuckoo model (i.e., in which the adversary only replaces the inputs
to some t processors).
For the synchronous model with a fixed set of faults we obtain a similar result. To obtain the result we
do not need the COMMON CORE part and Algorithm 1 is enough.2
Theorem 3. For n > 3t and deterministic protocols. A synchronous Byzantine fault system is equivalent
to a synchronous system in which the adversary replaces the inputs to some t processors and outgoing
messages from them it may delete in the first round, and in any future round it may delete outgoing messages
from some set of t processors.
2One can somewhat optimize the protocols in the synchronous case, but conceptually the simulation remains the same.
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Algorithm 5: Simulating a BI-MO(Binitial) system deterministic protocol
in an asynchronous system that satisfies with n > 3t.
1. set ∀k accept[k] := ∅; /* the sets of accepted senders at the given rounds; executed at processor p */
2. setM := ∅; M¯ := ∅; /* the set of accepted messages that were not processed yet , and the set of processed messages */
3. set O := ∅; ; /* the set of processors that their SM reached an output at the processor */
4. r := 1; /* the round number */
5. invoke CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast I; /* broadcast the input value, a processor sends also to itself */
6. do until SMp halts: /* participate in all CO SEND(`, ∗), ` ≤ r, protocols */
7. wait until |accept[r]| ≥ n− t and p ∈ accept[r];
8. accept[r] := COMMON CORE(accept[r]) /* the 2 rounds protocol to converge to shared n− t */
9. r := r + 1;
10. invoke CO SEND(r, p) to broadcast accept[r − 1]; /* broadcast the accepted and processed set in round r − 1 */
11. end.
In the Background:
12. Execute for each 〈r′, pi, pi〉 ∈ M: /* accepted message from pi for round r′ */
13. if r′ = 1 then start SMi with input pi; /* start a SM with the initial input */
14. if r′ > 1 then
15. let M := {mj | pj ∈ pi and SMj [r′ − 1] sends mj to pi}; /* the values pi should have received */
16. SMi[r
′] := F(M,SMi[r′ − 1], r′); /* apply protocol F to determine the next state of SMi */
17. if SMi outputs then O := O ∪ {pi}; /* Denote the outputting processor */
18. M :=M\ 〈r′, pi, pi〉;
19. M¯ := M¯ ∪ 〈r′, pi〉;
20. accept[r′] := accept[r′] ∪ {pi}.
6 Reliable Broadcast
In this section we present the traditional Reliable Broadcast protocol using the generalized faulty set con-
vention.
Definition 1 (Collection of Sets of Potentially Faulty Processors One of which can be Chosen by the Ad-
versary). The set B, called the collection of bad-sets, is closed under inclusion, i.e. if B ∈ B and B′ ⊆ B,
then B′ ∈ B. Let G be {Π \B | B ∈ B}.
B1: B satisfies the Benign Fault predicate if: any 2 potentially bad sets of processors Bi, Bj ∈ B, satisfy
Π 6⊆ Bi ∪Bj .
B2: B satisfies the Byzantine Fault predicate if: any 3 potentially bad sets Bi, Bj , Bk ∈ B, satisfy Π 6⊆
Bi ∪Bj ∪Bk.
Thus, the only difference between the Benign Fault predicate and the Byzantine Fault predicate is the
number of sets that do not cover the entire set of processors.
Corollary 2. The definition of the potentially Faulty sets that satisfy the Byzantine Fault predicate implies:
G1: For every G ∈ G, and any Bi, Bj ∈ B, it holds that G 6⊆ Bi ∪Bj .
G2: For any 2 potentially good sets Gi, Gj ∈ G, it holds that Gi ∩Gj ( B, B ∈ B.
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Proof. Proving G1: If G1 does not hold then Π ⊆ Bi ∪Bj ∪ {Π \G}, a contradiction.
Proving G2: If G2 does not hold then Π ⊆ {Π \Gi}∪ {Π \Gj}∪ {Gi ∩Gj}, a contradiction, since all sets
belong to B.
The Reliable Broadcast properties are:
RB1 If the sender s is correct when it invokes RB with a value v, then every processor will eventually
accept RB(s) with the value v.
RB2 If any (correct) processor accepts RB(s) with a value v′, then every processor will accept it with the
same value.
RB3 If sender s did not invoke RB(s) no processor will accept RB(s).
Notice that in our model there is no need to use the word “correct” in stating RB2.
Algorithm 6: RB(k, s): Reliable Broadcast
with asynchronous system that satisfies the Byzantine Fault predicate
/* executed by processor p with sender s, invoked once per k per sender */
1. set V := ∅; /* the set of m1 and m2 messages received, each processor also sends messages to itself */
2. Init: if p = s then send vs to all; /* s is the sender and vs the value it broadcasts */
3. Upon receiving a protocol message:
4. case received v from s: send m1(v) to all; /* executed at most once per protocol invocation */
5. case received m from q: add m to V ; /* add this m1 or m2 message to V */
6. case V contains m1(v) from a set G, G ∈ G or m2(v) from a set G′, G′ 6⊆ B, for any B ∈ B:
send m2(v) to all; /* send at most once per protocol invocation */
7. case V contains m2(v) from a set G ∈ G: /* process the sender’s message */
8. accept RB(k, s) with value v. /* accept message v as the message sent by processor s with index k */
The Reliable Broadcast protocol, Algorithm 6, is invoked per processor per an index k per sending round
and consists of 4 conceptual steps. Initially (step 1, Line 2) the sender of the current instance of the protocol
sends its initial value to everyone. Thus, everyone should wait to receive the appropriate initial value. Due
to asynchrony it may take time, but without faults, it would eventually arrive to everyone. Because of
maliciousness, the message may not arrive to every processor. Moreover, conflicting values might be sent to
different processors. The following steps intend to address exactly these difficulties.
If a processor receives an initial value (step 2, Line 4) it notifies every processor by sending m1(v)
message. Malicious behavior may cause different processors to send m1 messages for different values.
Each processor sends at most a single m1 message per invocation of the protocol (per round). A processor
may receive several m1 messages, even if it did not receive an initial value.
In step 3 (Line 6), a processor that has received identical copies ofm1 messages (i.e., for the same value)
from a set G ∈ G, sends an m2 message. Notice that if the original sender is correct, this will eventually
happen at every correct processor. Observe that by Corollary 2 no two correct processors send m2 messages
with conflicting values, since the protocol instructs a correct processor to send at most a single m1 message,
and no two correct processors will get identical copies ofm1 messages for different values from different set
in G. Notice that a processor may receive several m2 messages without receiving enough identical copies of
m1 messages from a set G ∈ G. If it receives m2 identical messages from a set G′, G′ 6⊆ B, for any B ∈ B,
it knows that at least one correct processor have sent one, so it can also join in by sending an m2 message
(potentially skipping step 2 on the way).
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To complete the protocol (step 4, Line 7) a processor waits to receive m2 identical messages from a
set G ∈ G. Once it receives that many identical m2 messages, and since any correct processor will either
send the identical message or none, it knows that eventually every processor will receive the m2 message
from at least a set G′, G′ 6⊆ B, for any B ∈ B. Any such correct processor will send an m2 message to
everyone else, which leads to everyone eventually receiving identical m2 messages from a set G ∈ G. Thus,
if any correct processor will agree to accept the message, eventually every correct processor will accept and
process all the prior messages and will accept the message.
Notice that the way Line 6 is presented it implies scanning an exponential number of sets - but it is clear
that it is enough to consider maximal sets, and the complexity becomes the number of maximal sets.
7 Related Work
The attempts of reducing Byzantine to Benign have a long history. Back in 1988 Coan [13] considered
running an asynchronous protocol written for the benign setting on a machine in which processors might
fail in a Byzantine manner. To deal with inputs he assumed that the inputs satisfy some predicate, and then
required the protocol to be written in a special form. This allowed him to check “backward compatibility”
and discard incorrect messages. But, it was not clear whether any asynchronous protocol can be put in the
form he required.
We, here, use the same idea as that of Coan, only that we do not require the special protocol form required
by Coan. We check “backward compatibility” just by asking a processor to send the set of processors it read
from. Since it is sent via Reliable Broadcast it allows the rest of the processors to delay accepting the
message until they simulate locally all the processors claimed in the message and then derive the interpreted
value themselves. In hindsight we believe Coan method can be tweaked to ours. Ours might be just an
inductive full-information version of Coan ideas.
As for general results reducing the Asynchronous Byzantine to the Benign such a reduction was derived
recently in [27], and rediscovered in [14]. But both reductions were explained only for colorless tasks.
They might apply to all tasks, but we will speculate that the fact that they could not ascribe meaning to
output of “byzantine processors” held them back. In fact, some of the author of [27] were involved in
formulating the beautiful task of Multi-Dimensions Vector -agreement [26]. The task is motivated by the
presence of Byzantine processors, but its computability is possible to analyze in the Benign model according
to the Cuckoo model. Nevertheless its computability in [26] is handled in the Byzantine setting with all the
complications and clutter it introduces. Reference [27] is mute about that possibility, although we view it as
a “killer application” to the benefit of the Cuckoo Model.
Thus the central contribution of our paper is conceptual. By making all processors “correct” and allow
them to join the computation once the Byzantine attack ceases we are forced to think a complete analogy
between the Byzantine and the Benign modulo changed inputs. The “byzantine processors” cluttered the
view of researchers, hence for instance, we are the first to notice that the Asynchronous Adversary model
of 2009 [16] applies verbatim to the Byzantine model. Missing the “correct” model might have cause
researchers to miss results which are essentially in plain view.
In between Coan [13] and [27] there were several attempts to simplify the t resilient asynchronous
Byzantine model through ideas of simulating simpler models. Attiya and Welch [7] reduced the problem to
Identical Byzantine. The pioneering work of Bracha [11, 12] was focused on improving the probabilistic
protocol of Ben-Or [9] from n/5 to n/3 and in order to do so Bracha developed a basic tool to limit the
power of the Byzantine adversary, The simulation we introduce in the paper makes use of this tool as part
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of the building block we introduce. Srikanth and Toueg [31] considered simulating the power of a signature
scheme to limit the Byzantine adversary, both in a synchronous system and an asynchronous one. Neiger and
Toueg [28] introduced direct simulations between models in order to solve consensus, but their simulations
are limited to synchronous models.
Last but not least as mentioned in the introduction our motivating papers were [5] and [20, 15]. Refer-
ence [20] implies that processors t-resiliently jointly can march any number (greater than t) of state machines
forward with at most t not progressing. In [15] state-machines are considered to be read-write threads (and
the commands to be what a processors proposes a a “read” value based on its internal simulation), hence
a protocol. Hence it makes an execution a group effort - our main motivating observation as to how this
might apply to the Byzantine. The [20] is a generalization of Schneider [30] using a state machine for im-
plementing fault-tolerant services. It generalizes [30] from when consensus is available to the case when
set-consensus is available rather than consensus. The t resilience allows for k + 1 set-consensus.
8 Conclusions
We presented a new view on the Byzantine model. In this view processors are not taken over by a malicious
Adversary. The Adversary takes over the outgoing communication attempted by some processors. For all
practical purposes the observable behavior is the same. Yet theoretically it allows us to consider “reviving”
a processor after an attack ceases as throughout the execution it snooped on the system progress. Thus, this
raised the challenge as to whether there is a way to completely reduce the Byzantine to the Benign with no
qualifications.
This paper present a way to do this. It is not prefect. We assume that faulty behavior will not be
experienced further at some processor without output, immediately after a new output is delivered past
n−t−1 outputs. Perfection would mean to replace this assumption of “immediately” with “eventually.” We
leave it as an open question whether this can be done (e.g. by changing the assumption that the adversary can
remove a message, to the one where the adversary can delay a message ad infinitum). Recovery necessitates
that a processor trying revival will resend a message. We discarded various schemes of “eventual” as we
could not bound the number of these extra resend messages.
Yet, with this somewhat flawed assumption, that nevertheless does not affects “observable behavior,” we
are able to reduce the extreme of Asynchronous Byzantine, to the other extreme of the Synchronous Benign.
What is left is to show that such reductions are true for other models e.g. those that utilize objects in their
communications. Indeed, implicitly such a reduction has been shown in [19] for objects of set-consensus
types, since there, objects are replaced by a restriction on runs.
It is now about making the reduction in this paper efficient, and finding “killer applications,” beyond [25,
32, 26]. Another direction is turning a probabilistic asynchronous consensus algorithms, into probabilistic
algorithms where the faults are benign.
The emulations discussed in this paper assume deterministic protocol. In order to extend the emulations
above to randomized protocols, one can’t just ask a processor to distribute together with its collected set its
random choice for the current round. The reason is that the adversary can make the Byzantine processors
to not draw the random bits from the expected distribution. To deal with that all processors collectively can
choose the random choices for each processor once it broadcasts its candidates’ set. In case n > 4t one can
compute any probabilistic function using Asynchronous Multi-Party-Computation, in the presence of up to
t Byzantine faults, see [10, 8]. One can use that as a building block in our protocols. The question of doing
that for n > 3t is an open problem.
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